How large are trade costs in the world's poorest countries and what are their consequences? I explore this question using a new dataset of monthly prices and production of 6 staple grains from 2003 to 2013 in 230 market catchment areas covering all 42 countries of continental subSaharan Africa. Using a new approach to identify cost parameters when trade and storage are unobserved, I estimate and solve a dynamic model including storage in each of the 230 markets, overland trade between them, and trade with the world market through 30 ports. I find median intra-national trade costs over 5 times higher than elsewhere in the world along with significant extra costs for trade across borders and with the world market. I then simulate a counterfactual in which trade costs for staple grains are lowered to match an international benchmark. Lowering trade costs results in a 46% drop in the average food price index, a 42% loss of net agricultural revenues, and a welfare gain equivalent to 2.2% of GDP. I show that 86% of this welfare gain can be achieved by lowering trade costs through ports and along key links representing just 18% of the trade network, supporting a corridor-based approach for infrastructure investment and trade policy. In an extension, I find that the effects of agricultural technology adoption depend crucially on trade costs, with technology adoption increasing farmer incomes only when trade costs are low. Compared to my dynamic monthly model with storage, a static annual model of agricultural trade underestimates trade costs by 23% and welfare effects by 33% by failing to correctly identify when trade occurs.
Introduction
The 42 countries of continental sub-Saharan Africa have a combined population of 960 million people. Despite recent economic growth, these countries have a GDP per capita of just 3.71 USD per day and include 21 of the 24 countries worldwide with a GDP per capita less than 2 USD per day. Agriculture is the dominant sector in most African economies: 64% of the labor force in sub-Saharan Africa works in agriculture and 44% of consumer expenditure is on food, with even higher numbers for the poorest countries. Although there are large areas of land well-suited to agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa, productivity in African agriculture is extremely low with output per hectare 5 times lower and output per worker 78 times lower than in North America, facts which (together with the large share of the labor force in agriculture) can explain most of the income differences between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world (Caselli 2005 , Restuccia et al 2008 , Vollrath 2009 ).
One of the most striking facts that emerges from data on the African agricultural sector is that the prices of agricultural products vary tremendously across space. The left panel of figure 1 shows monthly maize prices from four large hub markets in East Africa on a 2000 kilometer south-north axis from Songea -a maize surplus area in southern Tanzania -to Mandera -a maize deficit area in northern Kenya. The right panel shows equivalent maize prices from three markets in the US on a 2000 kilometer north-south axis from inland surplus area Minneapolis to the major export ports near New Orleans. By December 2011, maize prices in Mandera had exceeded 0.85 USD/kg during the height of the Horn of Africa famine -the first UN-declared famine in 30 years. Meanwhile, maize prices in New Orleans were 0.25 USD/kg and maize prices in Songea were a mere 0.15 USD/kg. Empirical evidence from African agricultural markets suggests that traders in large hub markets like those in figure 1 behave competitively, facing low four-firm concentration ratios and not deviating detectably from marginal cost pricing (Aker 2010 , Osborne 2005 . The large price gaps between markets within African countries, between African countries, and between Africa and the world market must therefore be reflective of large trade costs -the total costs involved in getting a product from a producer or trader in one location to a trader or consumer in another.
There are several reasons why one might expect ex ante that trade costs in Africa are higher than elsewhere in the world, including poor infrastructure, lots of borders with formal and informal tariffs and delays, vast interior areas far from ports including 16 countries that are completely landlocked, high fuel costs, etc. Several recent studies have provided evidence that freight rates and the distance-dependent component of total trade costs are two to five times higher in particular African countries than elsewhere in the world (Taravaninthorn and Raballand 2009, Atkin and Donaldson 2015) .
Given the importance of agricultural production and consumption in Africa, high trade costs and the large spatial price gaps they cause have significant consequences. In surplus regions like Songea, trade costs confine African farmers to local markets with low prices and inelastic demand, limiting their incentives for productivity-enhancing technology adoption. In deficit regions like Mandera, trade costs mean that African consumers face high food prices that fluctuate with volatile local harvests, leading to regular food security crises. How big are trade costs in the agricultural sector in Africa? What would be the gains from lowering them to match levels in other parts of the world? What is the most efficient way to achieve these gains? And how do trade costs alter the potential effects of productivity-enhancing technology adoption? This paper addresses these questions by building and estimating a dynamic model of African agricultural storage and trade.
I start by assembling a new intra-national dataset including ten years of monthly price and production data for the 6 major staple cereal grains in 230 regional markets covering all 42 countries of continental sub-Saharan Africa. While many previous studies have made use of spatial data on grain prices from individual countries or regions within sub-Saharan Africa 1 , I am the first to compile and use monthly intra-national grain price data from all countries in the entire subcontinent. I combine these price data with GIS grid cell level production data, which I allocate to individual markets using a market catchment methodology based on minimum travel time (Pozzi and Robinson 2008) . With data in hand, I proceed to write down, estimate, and solve a two-part model including (i) a model of consumer demand for staple grains and an outside numeraire good, from which I derive an expression for welfare; and (ii) a rational expectations model of monthly grain storage and trade under uncertainty (Williams and Wright 1991, chapter 9) including storage in each of the 230 markets, overland trade between them, and trade with the world market through 30 ports. Although the focus of this paper is trade and the consequences of high trade costs, forward-looking storage is inextricably linked to trade in a sector where uncertain harvests occur once or twice a year, harvest periods vary by location, and both harvests and prices fluctuate dramatically (figure 2). Dimensionality problems have traditionally restricted the use of this class of dynamic models to contexts involving two markets and a single commodity (e.g. Gouel and Jean 2015, Steinwender 2015) . I make use of an additional assumption about trader expectations that converts the intractable stochastic problem into a series of tractable deterministic problems, and I show that this assumption does not significantly affect my results. 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Niger, 1960 Niger, -2010 and Monthly Millet Prices (USD/kg) in Maradi, Niger, 2002 . Sources: FAO-STAT, FAO GIEWS.
My estimation strategy includes a new, iterative approach to inferring trade costs from price differences when precise data on where trade occurs is not available (as it was for Donaldson 2012 and Atkin and Donaldson 2015) . My median estimated intra-national trade cost using this approach is over 5 times higher than benchmark freight rates elsewhere in the world. My estimates appear to be in line with the results of trucking surveys (Taravaninthorn and Raballand 2009) and studies of the distance-dependent component of trade costs (Atkin and Donaldson 2015) , with larger magnitudes reflective of additional components of overall trade costs not previously captured. In reduced-form regressions, I find that higher trade costs are correlated with lower road quality, international borders, the absence of regional trade agreements, and lower scores on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank Logistics Performance Index. My port-to-world trade cost estimates are also over five times higher than benchmark shipping rates.
After verifying the goodness of fit of my model-generated equilibrium, I begin my counterfactual analysis. In my main counterfactual, I lower trade costs in Africa to match benchmark freight rates in other parts of the world. Lowering trade costs leads to a 46.4% drop in the average price index for staple grains across all markets, a decrease in continent-wide agricultural revenues net of storage and trade costs of $117.4 billion over ten years (-42.1%) , and a welfare gain equivalent to 2.2% of GDP (a $125 billion equivalent variation). The aggregate drop in prices and revenues is largely attributable to increased penetration of imports from the world market (the "missing food imports" of Tombe 2015) , with the gains from lower food prices outweighing the lost income for farmers. However, there is significant heterogeneity in my results, with exporting regions experiencing increases in prices, revenues, and welfare and some regions experiencing welfare losses due to terms-of-trade effects. My results are robust to different demand specifications and allowing for a long-run reallocation of factors of production between sectors.
Reducing trade costs everywhere in Africa may be politically and financially infeasible in the near future. However, in additional counterfactuals, I show that 86% of the aggregate welfare gain from lower trade costs can be achieved by lowering trade costs through ports and along key links representing just 18% of the trade network. This suggests that a corridor-based approach of the kind advanced by multilateral donors may be effective (African Development Bank 2010) .
In two additional counterfactuals I estimate the effects of widespread agricultural technology adoption under existing high trade costs and counterfactual low trade costs. In 2013, African cereal grain yields were half of South Asia's and a third of Latin America's due largely to the low use of inputs like fertilizer. Institutional donors and organizations like the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) are promoting widespread technology adoption to increase smallholder incomes and decrease food prices. While I find that doubling agricultural productivity under either existing high or counterfactual low trade costs does lower food prices, the effects on farmer incomes are dramatically different in the two cases, with net agricultural revenues actually falling by 71.4% under existing high trade costs and increasing by 12.4% under counterfactual low trade costs. These results underscore the importance of implementing policies to lower trade costs and improve market access in tandem with technology adoption initiatives. This paper is most closely related to a recent literature on trade costs along intra-national spatial transportation networks that has expanded rapidly since the seminal work of Donaldson 2012. Atkin and Donaldson 2015 estimate the distance-dependent component of intra-national trade costs within two sub-Saharan African countries (Ethiopia and Nigeria) using price and origin data for specific, narrowly-defined manufactured goods. Sotelo 2015 uses a richer dataset from Peru to explore how intra-national trade costs lower agricultural productivity by preventing agricultural producers in particular locations from specializing in the crops in which they have a comparative advantage, a mechanism which is less important in the African context for the range of crops that I consider. This paper goes beyond the existing literature in several important ways, including covering a larger network of African markets (including international trade between countries and with the world market) and using a dynamic monthly model with storage, which I show is important for identifying when trade occurs so as to avoid underestimating trade costs and welfare effects. In my case, using a static annual model underestimates trade costs by 23% and welfare effects by 33%.
The balance of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe the context and data. In Section 3, I present my model. In Section 4, I detail my estimation strategy, present my estimates for the model parameters including trade costs, and examine the goodness of fit of my estimated model. In Section 5, I present the results of my counterfactual analysis and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Context and Data
Agricultural products are consumed everywhere and produced nearly everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Due to data limitations and comparability issues, I restrict my attention in this paper to the consumption and production of the six major staple cereal grains: maize, millet, rice, sorghum, teff, and wheat 2 . Table 1 shows the relative share of cereal grains and other categories of agricultural goods in production value, caloric intake, and gross value of international trade in subSaharan Africa. Although they make up only 17.2% of the total value of agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa, cereal grains are by far the most important source of calories in African diets. Tubers like cassava and yams are another important source of staple carbohydrates, but their perishability and low value-to-weight ratios severely constrain their trade and storage. Cash crops like cocoa and tea make up the largest share of the value of African countries' international agricultural trade, but they differ from cereals in that their production is often localized near ports or in certain geographic niches and is nearly all exported to the world market. Grain trade in sub-Saharan Africa can be roughly classified into two types: farm-to-market and market-to-market trade. Although farm-to-market trade may involve much higher trade costs than market-to-market trade due to extremely poor rural infrastructure, I will not be able to capture farm-to-market trade and trade costs in a continent-level model due to data limitations and will focus exclusively on market-to-market trade instead. One important difference between the two types of trade is the level of competition -while farm-to-market trade may be conducted by relatively few traders with significant market power, market-to-market trade at the level considered here tends to be highly competitive with many traders, low firm concentration ratios, homogeneous products, and few barriers to entry (Osborne 2005 , Aker 2010 ). I will therefore assume that traders are competitive price-takers.
Grain is bought and sold in thousands of open-air markets across sub-Saharan Africa. I seek to identify and include in my model the larger, regionally important hub markets that collect grain from surrounding smaller markets for trade with other hub markets. I do so in three steps. First, I include the 178 towns and cities in my 42 countries of interest which have a population of at least 100,000 people and are at least 200 kilometers apart (if two towns with over 100,000 people are closer than 200 kilometers I include the larger one). Second, I add smaller towns that are located at important road junctions or ports. Third, I add additional major towns (some closer than 200 kilometers apart) in countries which still have high population-to-market ratios after my first two steps. Together these steps produce a list of 263 markets (cities/towns).
In order to be able to include a particular market in my model, I must have grain price data for it. Using my "ideal" list of 263 markets, I conducted an exhaustive search for monthly grain price series from these markets and obtained price series for 230 of them. I then used maps of road networks and navigable waterways to identify the pairs of these markets between which direct trade (trade that does not pass through another market in the network) is feasible. A map of my final network of 230 markets with the 413 direct links between them is shown in figure 3 . A complete list of markets and further details on the market selection process are contained in the online appendix.
The median market town has a population of 207,000, and the median transport distance between directly linked markets is 337 kilometers. Among the 230 markets, I identify 30 major ports that trade with the world market and include direct links between them and the most important world market for each crop (Bangkok, Thailand for rice and the US Gulf for maize, sorghum, and wheat; millet and teff are generally not traded on the world market except for small shipments by specialized companies). I also treat Johannesburg, South Africa like the world market for maize in my model due to its special circumstances 3 .
The monthly grain price series for the 230 markets cover a 10-year period from May 2003 to April 2013. The price series include series for the 6 cereal grains most produced and consumed in sub-Saharan Africa -maize (45.6% of total cereal grain production), sorghum (21.8%), millet (14.3%), rice (7.7%), wheat (5.3%), and teff (2.6%) 4 . In each market, only a subset of these major grains are sold -54 markets have price series for 1 grain, 111 have series for 2 grains, 24 have series for 3 grains, and 41 have series for 4 grains. Maize is by far the most common grain with price series from 180 of the 230 markets, followed by rice (126), sorghum (110), millet (64), wheat (23), and teff (9). Of the 512 total price series, 42% were obtained from the World Food Programme's VAM unit and 25% from FAO's GIEWS project, which both maintain online databases of staple food 3 These include its functioning commodity exchange which is used as a reference point throughout Southern Africa, its close integration with the world market, South Africa's very large maize production relative to its neighbors, and South Africa's advanced internal market information systems. Johannesburg is the only market from South Africa included in my model for the same reasons.
4 The remaining 2.7% of total cereal grain production consists of minor cereal grains (barley, oats, fonio, etc.). price series collected by themselves or by national government agencies. The remaining 33% were obtained directly from national ministries of agriculture and statistical offices or through USAID's FEWS NET project, non-governmental organizations, and other researchers. Each original source typically employs teams of surveyors who observe and record prices at multiple points of sale in each location on a weekly or monthly basis and then relay them to analytical teams in the capital city who compile and publish monthly and annual reports. The price series are not all complete -the average series has 72 observations (6 years) worth of data. The original price series are in local currency. Of the 512 series, 76% are identified as retail price series for quantities ranging from 0.5 to 3.5 kg, while the remaining 24% are identified as wholesale price series for quantities ranging from 50 to 100 kg. I convert all price series to USD/kg using monthly exchange rates and conduct a statistical analysis of 37 series for which I have both retail and wholesale prices that fails to reject a hypothesis of equality between retail and wholesale prices. This is consistent with interviews of market participants which suggest that separate retail and wholesale markets typically do not exist and that prices per kilogram often do not vary with quantity sold. Details on this statistical test as well as the grain types and data sources by market are contained in the online appendix.
Across all time periods and all markets, average prices are $0.41/kg for maize, $0.44/kg for wheat, $0.45/kg for both millet and sorghum, $0.58/kg for teff, and $0.84/kg for rice. Regressions with market fixed effects comparing price levels within particular markets show maize significantly cheaper than sorghum, which is significantly cheaper than millet and wheat, which are significantly cheaper than teff, which is significantly cheaper than rice (significance at the 5% level).
My next step is to acquire production and population data for sub-Saharan Africa and assign each of the 230 markets a monthly production and population to match its monthly prices. I start by obtaining annual national totals for production of all cereal grains from FAO and annual national totals for population from the UN Population Division. To allocate the production data by month, I use agricultural calendar data from FAO to divide the continent into three zones: a Northern Hemisphere zone with a single annual grain harvest in October (112 markets), an Equatorial zone with a larger grain harvest (two-thirds of the annual total) in July and a smaller grain harvest (one-third of the annual total) in December (70 markets), and a Southern Hemisphere zone with a single annual grain harvest in May (48 markets) 5 .
Allocating the national-level data by market is more challenging. I first obtain GIS grid cell level data for population and production of each crop for the year 2000 at the 5 arc-minute (10 km by 10 km) level from the GAEZ project of FAO and IIASA and the HarvestChoice project of IFPRI and the University of Minnesota 6 and use it to derive the percentage of national population and production of each crop belonging to each grid cell. Under the assumption that these percentages stay constant during my study period, I combine them with my monthly national production and population data to get monthly production and population series at the grid cell level. The final step is to assign grid cells to particular markets. I do this by constructing market catchment areas following the methodology of Pozzi and Robinson 2008 . The underlying assumption of this methodology is that if producers and consumers in a given grid cell have to choose one of the markets in the network at which to sell and buy their grain they will choose the market to which they can travel in the least time. To identify which of the 230 markets is the closest in terms of travel time for each of the 292,000 grid cells, I combine information from the following GIS datasets: the roads layer from the World Food Programme's SDI-T database 7 , the FAO Land and to different land cover classes, and I then adjust these speeds based on the degree of slope of the terrain. I assign inland water bodies and rivers with Strahler number of at least 4 a travel speed of zero (except when crossed by a bridge) 8 . I also assign a travel speed of zero to international borders so as to keep market catchment areas within countries to match my national production and population data. Combining all of this information, I assign each pixel a travel cost in minutes and then use a least-cost path algorithm to identify the minimum travel time from each grid cell to any market in the network. I then assign each grid cell to the market catchment area of its nearest market in terms of travel time. Figure 4 shows maps of estimated grid-cell level travel time to the nearest market in the network and the resulting market catchment areas. Once each grid cell has been assigned to a market catchment area, it is straight-forward to add up the production and population data for all of the grid cells in a given market catchment area and assign the total production and population to that market and its price series. Although my 512 price series do not include a price for every grain in every market, 86.3% of total cereal grain production in my countries of interest is covered by a price series in its associated market.
To obtain an initial sense of the dispersion of agricultural production across market catchment areas, I use a comprehensive database of the caloric value of food crops in Africa (Leung 1968 ) to assign an approximate caloric level per unit weight to all staple carbohydrates (cereal grains as well as tubers and plantains) and convert production data into calories 9 . The median market catchment area had a 2010 population of 2.37 million and has an average production per capita of 1,863 kcal per day of staple carbohydrates during my study period. Average production ranges from 0 to 10,347 kcal per person per day with 63 markets (27.4%) producing less than 1,000 kcal per person per day and 54 markets (23.5%) producing more than 3,000 kcal per person per day, suggesting significant opportunities for net trade between markets. Table 2 shows results from regressing the average price level for each of the 512 price series on market characteristics and crop fixed effects to reveal some basic correlations. Town population and whether or not the town is a capital city are not significantly correlated with higher or lower price levels. Ports appear to be weakly correlated with higher price levels, which is likely due to the geography of much of sub-Saharan Africa in which grain production is concentrated in inland non-port regions and port cities must import grains from either the inland regions or the world market. In contrast, per capita production (kcal/person/day) is significantly negatively correlated with price levels. The point estimates imply that price levels are on average 2 cents (5%) lower for each additional 1,000 kcal/person/day production of staple carbohydrates.
Having assembled a dataset of monthly prices, production, and population for a network of 230 market catchment areas covering all 42 countries of continental sub-Saharan Africa, I proceed in the next section to build a dynamic model of grain consumption, storage, and trade.
Model
My model uses the notation and basic framework of the one-commodity, two-market rational expectations storage and trade model of Williams and Wright 1991, chapter 9, which I extend to include the storage and trade of 6 grains across the network of 230 African markets and the world market built in the previous section. I embed this storage and trade model within a simple general equilibrium setting by including a composite outside good. While the six grains are subject to trade costs between locations (which I estimate), the outside good has no trade costs so that its price is the same in all locations, and I choose units so as to normalize its price to 1 10 . Production of the outside good is used either for final consumption or for trade and storage services in the agricultural sector. In my simplest baseline case reflective of the short-term, I abstract away from production decisions by letting production of both the 6 grains and the outside good be an exogenous endowment that is unaffected by price changes. In an extension presented at the end of this section, I explicitly model production in each sector and allow for reallocation of factors of production between sectors in response to price changes. In each location, a representative consumer chooses monthly consumption of each grain and the outside good to maximize utility and a representative competitive grain trader with rational expectations chooses monthly storage, trade, and local sales of each grain to maximize profits. I proceed by considering each of these agents in turn.
A Model of Consumer Demand and Welfare
Let m index the markets in the network, t the time periods in months, and i the six grains in my dataset, with I m the set of grains sold in a particular market m. Let the representative consumer in market m have utility quasilinear in a grain composite Q mt and the outside good X mt :
where θ mt is a parameter and < 0. Let preferences for individual grains be CES with elasticity of substitution σ and share parameters α im (normalized such that i∈Im α im = 1):
Let Y mt represent total income, which is endogenous to the model but which the consumer takes as given. The consumer chooses consumption to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint:
where A m is a parameter and N mt is the population of market catchment m in time t 11 . Taking first order conditions and solving for demand 12 gives:
where P mt is the CES grain price index (P mt = i∈Im α im P 1−σ imt 1/(1−σ) ). This demand structure has three important and desirable features:
(1) Demand is non-homothetic. Demand for staple grains is independent of income and depends only on price. Demand for the composite numeraire good is the residual X mt = Y mt − P imt Q imt . In other words, consumers decide first how much grain to buy (based on grain prices) and then use all remaining income to buy the composite numeraire good 13 .
11 For notational simplicity, the representative consumer in each market is treated as a single aggregate consumer. The derived expressions for demand and welfare are equivalent to those for a population of N mt individual consumers each with θ − mt = A m whose incomes sum to Y mt . 12 The full derivation for the demand and welfare expressions in this section is provided in the online appendix. 13 Related papers with demand functions for agricultural products and an outside good typically use either homothetic Cobb-Douglas preferences with income elasticity 1 (e.g. Sotelo 2015) or quasilinear preferences with income elasticity 0 as I have here (e.g. Costinot et al 2014) . The quasilinear structure is helpful for model tractability and more realistic in my view than homothetic demand. Engel's law suggests an income elasticity between 0 and 1. Empirical estimates for the income elasticity of expenditure on the category "cereals" are available for 39 of the countries in my dataset and range from 0.363 to 0.685 (Muhammad et al 2011) , but this includes expenditure on processed cereals (e.g. flour and bread). Income elasticity estimates for staple grains themselves in Africa are as low as 0.030 (maize, Nairobi, Gsaenger and Schmidt 1977) . In my main counterfactual, 81% of markets experience an income change less than 5% and 96% less than 10%, so a positive income elasticity would not change my results substantially.
(2) Demand for staple grains has constant price elasticity . This demand elasticity has been precisely estimated in the literature (Roberts and Schlenker 2013) , an estimate which I will use in my baseline specification. (3) Demand for staple grains has constant population elasticity 1. A doubling in population size will lead to a doubling in quantity demanded for staple grains at a given price.
For integration with the representative trader's side of the model I will use the inverse demand function for a particular grain i:
Equation 4 can be used to derive an expression for indirect utility V mt :
The main counterfactual scenario in my paper -lowering trade costs -acts through changes in grain prices, which affect both terms in this expression. A price increase, for instance, has a positive effect on welfare by increasing revenue from grain sales (which is part of income Y mt ) but has a negative effect on welfare by raising consumer prices (the second term).
For any counterfactual, the associated welfare change for market m for the entire period of interest expressed as a percentage of baseline GDP is given by:
where the prime symbol denotes counterfactual values. Given quasilinear preferences, the numerator of equation 7 is the equivalent variation of the counterfactual, since additional income is spent exclusively on the outside good, for which price and marginal utility are both equal to 1.
A Model of Grain Storage and Trade
Consider the problem of a representative competitive trader in market m in month t who takes prices as given. Without loss of generality, consider the trader's problem for a particular crop i. The trader enters the period with non-negative stocks of crop i from the previous period (S im,t−1 ≥ 0). In addition, the trader buys up all local production of crop i (H imt , with H imt = 0 in all months except for market m's harvest months). The trader then must decide how much of this total available supply (S im,t−1 + H imt ) to sell for local consumption (Q imt ), how much to put into storage for the next period (S imt ≥ 0), and how much to trade with other markets indexed n (T imnt , where T imnt > 0 indicates exports from m to n, T imnt < 0 indicates imports from n to m). The choice of any two of these three variables determines the value of the other: I focus on the choice of S imt and T imnt and solve for consumption in a later step using the market clearing condition:
There are obviously many factors that our representative trader must take into account when making her decision. Storage and trade both entail some costs. I make the standard assumption that there are no costs to move grain into and out of storage, but that there is a per-unit monthly storage cost k m and a monthly interest rate r m in market m. Let τ mn represent per-unit trade costs from market m to market n. I assume that trade costs are additive, symmetric (τ mn = τ nm ), and cumulative (τ mo = τ mn + τ no if trade from m to o must travel via n). Despite being unusual in the recent trade literature, additive trade costs are standard in models of agricultural storage and trade where additive freight rates tend to be much larger empirically than ad valorem costs like tariffs due to low value-to-weight ratios (see for instance Steinwender 2015) . Letting trade costs be cumulative allows me to focus exclusively on the 413 direct links shown in figure 3 (plus 49 direct links with the world market) rather than the 26,335 possible combinations of 230 markets, since I can capture 100 units traded from m to o as 100 units traded from m to n and 100 units traded from n to o if trade from m to o must travel via n. Let N m ∈ M represent the subset of markets with which market m trades directly (excluding itself).
Our representative trader must also take prices into account, both in her own market and in the N m markets with which she directly trades. Moreover, the possibility of storage means that expected future prices must also be considered. With this in mind, I write the trader's profit maximization problem in period t as:
where S ims ≥ 0 and there is one T imns for every n in N m . Combining this with the market clearing condition (equation 8) I get:
Taking the first-order condition with respect to S imt gives the temporal arbitrage condition:
Taking the first-order condition with respect to T imnt gives the spatial arbitrage conditions:
The world market enters the model through 49 direct links subject to the spatial arbitrage conditions in equation 12. As sub-Saharan Africa's cereal grain production makes up only 5% of world production, I assume that traders take the world market prices as given and can import or export unlimited quantities from the world market at these prices (plus trade costs), so I do not include storage, trade, and consumption outside of Africa in my model 14 . The model thus combines elements of a small open economy taking world prices as given and a closed economy with local prices determined endogenously, as in Sotelo 2015.
Competitive Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, the representative consumer in each location maximizes utility, the representative trader in each location maximizes profits, and markets clear. Since grain demand is independent of income, the equilibrium in the grain market can be fully characterized before considering the numeraire good:
Definition 1. A grain market equilibrium is a set of prices P imt , consumption Q imt , storage S imt , and trade T imnt such that the inverse consumption demand function (equation 5), temporal and spatial arbitrage conditions (equations 11 and 12), and market clearing condition (equation 8) hold for every grain i, market m, market pair mn, and time period t.
The numeraire good can be traded but not stored and can be used either for final consumption or for trade and storage services in the agricultural sector. Therefore, local production of the numeraire good (Π mt ) must equal the sum of local final consumption (X mt ), net exports of the numeraire good n∈Nm T Xmnt , and expenditure on local storage services and local trade services (half of trade costs for a market pair are allocated to each market), as summarized in the following accounting identity:
Total income for a given market m and period t is the sum of revenue from selling the production of the numeraire good (Π mt ) at price 1 and from sales of grains net of storage and trade costs 15 :
Once the model has been solved for a grain market equilibrium, equation 14 and data on income Y mt can be used to solve for Π mt 16 . In my counterfactual scenarios, the endogenous variables change, meaning that overall income Y mt changes according to equation 14. Income and prices under both baseline and counterfactual can then be plugged into equation 7 to obtain the change in welfare. I define a full competitive equilibrium as follows:
14 I treat Johannesburg, South Africa in the same way as the world market for the reasons described previously, i.e. Johannesburg is treated as exogenous to the model with traders in connected markets in neighboring countries able to import or export unlimited quantities at the Johannesburg price (plus trade costs).
15 Note that trade costs τ mn do not appear explicitly here as they are accounted for by the use of the local price.
16 Practically speaking, I multiply N mt by national per capita GDP for the relevant year and country and divide by 12 to obtain Y mt for each market m and month t. This implicitly assumes that GDP per capita is the same across regions of a country, a necessary assumption to obtain estimates of market-level income.
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium consists of a grain market equilibrium together with consumption X mt of the numeraire good such that equation 13 holds for every market m and time period t and trade for every market m is balanced in every period t:
A competitive equilibrium can clearly be found directly from a grain market equilibrium using equations 13 and 15. I therefore spend the rest of this section exploring the properties of a grain market equilibrium.
The model makes strong predictions about when and where grain storage and trade occur in equilibrium. Under identical or similar storage costs, traders will "store first and trade later" in equilibrium, with storage and imports never occurring simultaneously. This is a general result for this class of commodity storage and trade models first noted by Williams and Wright 1991, chapter 9. The intuition is that it is cheaper for storage to occur in the exporting market so as not to incur interest on the trade costs in the importing market. The following proposition and its corollaries summarize the relevant results: Proposition 1. Consider any two markets m and n. If m and n have identical storage costs then neither market stores and imports from the other simultaneously in equilibrium, i.e. for any month t and grain i:
with a symmetric condition holding for S imt and trade from n to m.
Corollary 1. Consider a particular harvest year for two markets m and n with net trade of grain i from m to n in equilibrium. Let the harvest year months be indexed s with the last month before the next harvests. Let the first month with trade from m to n be designated s * . Then the following must be true for any grain i:
Traders store first and trade later.
Trade from m to n only occurs in s * . (iii) For any values of r m , r n , k m , and k n , the pattern of storage and trade will be the same as (i) if the following expression is negative and the same as (ii) if the following expression is positive:
Corollary 2. Given a set of demand and cost parameters, there is a unique grain market equilibrium (competitive equilibrium).
Proof. See appendix.
Importantly, these results establish that storage and trade flows (not just prices and consumption) are unique, which means that the set of periods in which the spatial and temporal arbitrage conditions (equations 11 and 12) hold with equality is unique. Intuitively, equation 17 encapsulates the trade-off between storing in the exporting market (m) and storing in the importing market (n). Practically speaking, there is little reason why k and r would be significantly different between a particular market and its direct trading partners (particularly when they are within the same country), so equation 17 is likely to be negative (especially with high trade costs), implying that case (i) holds in most cases. This means that trade will generally only occur (and the spatial arbitrage conditions will generally only hold with equality) during the later months of the harvest year.
Extension: A Model of Production
In the baseline case, I assume for tractability and transparency that production of both grains and the outside good are exogenous endowments that do not change in my counterfactuals. This assumption is realistic in the short term when factors of production are immobile. In the longer term, factors of production would likely reallocate as a result of the relative price changes in my counterfactuals. Incorporating a supply response into a rational expectations model of commodity storage and trade and estimating supply parameters is a non-trivial task that is beyond the scope of this paper, particularly given the fact that agricultural producers typically make planting decisions ahead of time based on expected future prices with supply realizations affected by subsequent stochastic shocks. In this section, I outline a simplified approach under the assumptions that the price elasticity of supply is a known constant, that supply decisions are made in the harvest month, and that these decisions do not affect expected future harvests, which are still exogenous. Importantly, while allowing for a supply response changes my counterfactual equilibria, it has no effect on my estimation of the demand and cost parameters and the baseline equilibrium, as these rely on actual production data. For simplicity, assume that there is a single composite factor of production called labor (L). In each time period, the labor endowment in each market (L mt ) is allocated between production of the numeraire good and each grain i:
Let production of the numeraire good be linear in labor (Π mt = B X L Xmt ) and production of each grain be concave in labor 17 :
where B imt is a crop-market-time specific productivity shock and 0 < β < 1. Labor is perfectly mobile between sectors, and workers are paid a wage W equal to the value of their marginal product. Given that the freely-traded numeraire good is produced everywhere with the same technology, the wage W is equal across locations. Choose units of labor such that W = 1. Then for any grain i:
Combining equations 19 and 20 leads to the following supply function:
The supply function in equation 21 has a constant price elasticity of supply η = β 1−β . For a given value of η, equation 21 can be used with data on H imt and baseline equilibrium prices P imt to back out the implied productivity shocks B imt . These can then be used with equation 19 to obtain implied L imt , which can then be used with equation 18 and equilibrium Π mt (solved for in the previous section) to solve for labor endowmentsL mt given that
In my counterfactual scenarios, I can then endogenize the harvests H imt by incorporating equation 21 into the model and back out the new production of the numeraire good by subtracting the implied L imt for the new harvests H imt from the fixed labor endowmentsL mt . Proposition 1 and its corollaries are unaffected by the addition of a supply response, so the grain market equilibrium (competitive equilibrium) is still unique.
Estimation
In this section, I first outline how I solve the model from the previous section given a set of parameters. I then describe how I estimate both the demand parameters and the cost parameters using my price data and present the results from these estimates. Finally, I explore the goodness of fit of my estimated model. Table 3 summarizes the parameters and variables in the core grain market model summarized by equations 5, 8, 11, and 12. My estimation of the demand parameters and cost parameters using price data is detailed in subsequent sections. In this section, I describe how I solve for the grain market equilibrium (endogenous S imt , T imt , Q imt , and P imt ) given a set of demand and cost parameters and data on the exogenous variables (N mt , H imt , and world prices). 
Solution Algorithm for Given Parameters
When a representative trader in market m in time t decides how much of grain i to store, trade, and sell locally, she must take into account both the current and expected future values of the exogenous variables for her market and all others. The complexity of the resulting problem has traditionally limited the application of rational expectations commodity storage and trade models to contexts involving two markets and a single commodity (e.g. Gouel and Jean 2015, Steinwender 2015) 18 . I make the following assumption to be able to apply the model to my network of 230 markets and 6 commodities:
Assumption. When making storage decisions, traders assume (i) that all future harvests will equal a linear prediction of the subsequent harvest and (ii) that all future world prices will equal the current world price.
This is a strong assumption that eliminates the effects of uncertainty on traders' storage decisions and could therefore lead to under-estimation of equilibrium storage 19 (Williams and Wright 1991, chapter 3) . However, I show in later sections by estimating smaller scale models with full rational expectations using my parameter estimates from Africa that it does not significantly affect my results in this context, largely due to the high storage costs in Africa and its position as a net grain importer, which limit inter-annual storage of grains even under full rational expectations 20 .
Practically speaking, this assumption converts the intractable stochastic problem into a series of tractable deterministic dynamic problems (one for each of the 120 months of interest), which I solve consecutively using the PATH solver in GAMS. For a given month t, traders are given: (1) initial stocks (S im,t−1 ) from the previous month, (2) current harvests (H imt ), (3) expected harvests for the following year (calculated separately for each market each year based on regression results from harvests over the previous 10 years with a time trend), (4) current population and population for the following year (which I assume is known with perfect foresight), and (5) identical current and expected future world prices. For month t, I let traders plan for a sufficiently long time horizon (with repeated identical expected harvest, population, and world prices) such that initial shocks are smoothed out and storage decisions start repeating themselves with inter-annual storage falling to zero 21 . I then solve for all trader decisions for this time horizon, record the endogenous variables only for the first month (month t), and then move forward to the next month (t + 1), repeating the same exercise with initial stocks S imt . To obtain initial stocks for the very first month ( 
Estimation of Demand Parameters
Given the solution algorithm for a given set of parameters, the only remaining task to be able to solve the model is to actually estimate the parameters. To estimate the demand parameters, the detailed price data that I have must be combined with data on consumption. Unfortunately, analogous intra-national monthly consumption data for grains does not exist for Africa. Instead, I combine my production data with national annual data on imports and exports of each grain obtained from CEPII's BACI project (Gaulier and Zignago 2010) to back out national annual consumption of each grain as the sum of production and net imports 22 . I then proceed to estimate my demand parameters using these national annual data and average national annual prices for each grain across markets and months. I use these estimated national parameters for all markets within a country under the implicit assumption that the per capita grain demand function is identical in different markets within a single country 23 .
The degree of averaging and aggregation necessary for this exercise makes the estimation of precise elasticities of substitution (σ) and demand ( ) difficult. Consequently, rather than using estimated elasticities, for my baseline case I let preferences among grains be Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1) and use a precise and well-identified estimate of the elasticity of demand for staple grains from Roberts and Schlenker 2013 ( = −0.066). To confirm that these values are realistic, I estimate the elasticities by running instrumental variables regressions on my annual national consumption and price data. As an instrument, I use the landed world price (the world price plus the average price difference between the world market and the country's largest city, which is a lower bound on trade costs). The identifying assumption is that the landed world price only affects the quantity consumed through its effect on the local price. The details of these regressions as well as their OLS equivalents are reported in the online appendix and the results summarized in table 4. As expected, these estimates are imprecise, but it is reassuring to note that σ = 1 and = −0.066 are both within the 95% confidence intervals of my instrumental variables estimates. Since the elasticities I use are on the low end of elasticity estimates in the literature (particularly for σ), I later report the results of robustness checks using higher elasticity values 24 . For a given σ and , it is straight-forward to estimate α im and A m for each country. In the Cobb-Douglas case (σ = 1), α im is the expenditure share on grain i. Quantity and price indices can then be computed using σ and α im , and A m can then be solved for using equation 4. Due to the small number of annual observations, I combine several neighboring countries with similar per capita grain consumption and estimate α im and A m for 28 countries or groups of countries 25 . Note: Standard errors in () are bootstrapped (10,000 iterations); * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. c Joint estimation with Central African Republic.
Estimation of Cost Parameters
The storage cost parameters (r m and k m ) and trade cost parameters (τ mn ) are more difficult to estimate, and my estimation strategy is more innovative. Let C be the set of unknown cost parameters to be estimated and P be the set of price data. The key challenge is to identify the sets of crop-market (pair)-months in which storage and trade occur in equilibrium (S and T). Since the arbitrage conditions in equations 11 and 12 hold with equality in these periods, the price data in these periods can be used to estimate C. However, S and T are not observed and in equilibrium are clearly a function of the set of cost parameters C itself. My approach is to search for an internally consistent fixed point in which my cost parameters C exactly match the estimates I obtain from solving for equilibrium S and T with those cost parameters and re-estimating C with the price data only in crop-market (pair)-months S(C) and T(C). Mathematically, I find C such that:
Based on the spatial arbitrage conditions (equation 12), my estimation rules C(P, S, T) identify trade costs (τ mn ) using price differences between markets during periods with trade. Letting T mn denote the set of crop-months in which trade occurs between market pair mn in equilibrium and T mn denote the total number of crop-month pairs in T mn , my estimation rule for each trade cost parameter τ mn is:
Based on the temporal arbitrage conditions (equation 11), my estimation rules C(P, S, T) identify storage costs (r m and k m ) using the rise in price in market m from the harvest month to the month following the final month with storage within each harvest year y. Let D imy be the number of consecutive periods in harvest year y starting with the harvest month for which there is storage of grain i in market m in equilibrium. Let P min imy and P max imy be the minimum and maximum prices during these periods and the month immediately following. Rather than estimating storage costs at the individual market level, I estimate storage costs in 5 broad regions with similar institutions and climates (Southern Africa, East Africa including the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, the West Coast of Africa, and the Sahel). For each region, I run a non-linear regression to estimate r m and k m such that the following equation holds 26 :
To find an internally consistent fixed point, I start with an initial guess for the cost parameters (C 0 ), solve for equilibrium using the procedure from section 4.1 so as to find S(C 0 ) and T(C 0 ), 26 Note that D imy is the number of times by which P and then combine these with the price data and my estimation rules (equations 23 and 24) to re-estimate C 1 (P, S(C 0 ), T(C 0 )). I repeat this procedure until I converge to a fixed point for which
Since the arbitrage conditions never bind if costs are prohibitively high, it is important to start the estimation procedure with a set of cost parameters (C 0 ) that is a lower bound of the true parameters. A logical candidate is the set of cost parameters obtained by estimating equations 23 and 24 under the assumption that trade and storage occur always and everywhere (i.e. T and S include all crop-market (pair)-months, so T mn = 120 for all mn and D imy = 11 for all imy) 27 .
Starting at this C 0 , it takes 11 iterations to converge to a fixed point. Table 6 reports results of monthly interest rates r m and additive storage costs k m by region. The magnitudes of both parameters are high but on par with anecdotal evidence from Africa 28 .
The relative size of k m across regions matches exactly their ordering in terms of relative humidity (a major determinant of the cost of grain storage), from humid Central Africa and the West Coast through the arid Sahel. The relative size of r m across regions is similar to their ordering in the World Bank's Doing Business indicators, in which countries in Central Africa consistently score the lowest and the West Coast receives relatively high scores in the Getting Credit component. Note: Standard errors in () are block bootstrapped (10,000 iterations) at the cluster (market) level; * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Trade cost estimates with standard errors for each of the 413 overland links in figure 3 are presented in the online appendix. In order to compare trade cost estimates to one another, it is useful to convert them to cost per tonne-kilometer 29 . Among the 271 domestic links, the median estimated trade cost is $0.287/t-km. The lowest estimated trade cost is along the heavily-used paved road between Mombasa and Nairobi, Kenya ($0.049/t-km) while the highest trade costs include the virtually-impassable dirt track between Kananga and Tshikapa, D.R. Congo ($3.34/tkm) and the dirt road between Rumbek and Wau, South Sudan ($3.57/t-km), along which trade 27 The fact that C 0 is a lower bound also enables me to avoid the possibility of infinite loops (e.g. due to measurement error) by only updating τ mn if τ x+1 mn > τ x mn . This ensures monotonicity and hence convergence since costs are bounded above.
28 For example, interviews I conducted with private traders in Tanzania and Malawi suggest that they face annual interest rates of 25-40%, while the World Food Programme's full cost of no-loss private storage in Zambia is approximately 0.010 USD/kg.
29 Tonne (abbreviated t) refers to the metric ton (1000 kg).
was often slowed or blocked due to flooding and land mines during the study period. The fact that my estimates are higher than baseline freight rates likely reflects the significant additional components of trade costs (information costs, tariffs, risk of losses, etc.) beyond transport costs in the African context 30 . The same study reports estimated freight rates from elsewhere in the world: $0.02/t-km in Pakistan, $0.035 in Brazil, $0.04 in the US, and $0.05 in China and the European Union. My median trade cost estimate from Africa is thus over 5 times higher than transport costs elsewhere in the world. For my counterfactual analysis, I will lower trade costs in Africa to $0.05/t-km, the highest of these reported freight rates from elsewhere in the world. In advanced agricultural markets, trade costs are unlikely to have significant components beyond baseline freight rates. In the online appendix, I analyse price differences for maize along 11 direct transportation links between 8 markets within the US using analogous price data from the same period and find a median price difference of $0.012/t-km with only 1.1% of observations higher than $0.05/t-km. Atkin and Donaldson 2015 estimate the distance-dependent component of intra-national trade costs in Ethiopia and Nigeria by observing how prices of specific manufactured goods increase as they travel further from their entry port or production point and compare them to analogous estimates for the US. They estimate that the effect of distance on trade costs is 3.19 times higher in Ethiopia than in the US and 5.40 times higher in Nigeria than in the US when using road distance as their distance metric. In comparison, I estimate an average overall trade cost of $0.257/t-km for intra-national links in Ethiopia and $0.437/t-km for intra-national links in Nigeria, 5.14 and 8.74 times higher than the benchmark freight rate of $0.05/t-km from Taravaninthorn and Raballand 2009. The ratio of Nigerian to Ethiopian intra-national trade costs that I find (1.70) is reassuringly close to that of Atkin and Donaldson 2015 (1.69) , while the apparently larger ratios of African trade costs to US trade costs that I find are likely due to the significant non-distance-dependent components of trade costs that Atkin and Donaldson 2015 do not explicitly measure. Table 8 30 The recent trade literature has established that there are other significant components to overall trade costs beyond transport costs (see for instance Anderson and Van Wincoop 2004) . Allen 2014 finds that information frictions account for roughly half of overall trade costs in agricultural markets in the Philippines. Sotelo 2015 estimates overall trade costs 2.5 times higher than freight rates in the agricultural sector in Peru. Aker et al 2014 find agricultural trade costs of at least 20% to cross the "border" between two ethnic groups in Niger.
groups the 33 African countries with at least one domestic link by level of average estimated intra-national trade cost. In table 9, I explore correlations between my overland trade cost estimates and link characteristics through reduced-form regressions. Column (1) shows that crossing an international border is correlated with a $0.0681 increase in trade costs ($68/tonne) and that longer distances are correlated with a $0.119/t-km increase in trade costs. In column (2) I interact the distance variable with indicator variables for whether the link is fully paved (52.5%), partially or fully unpaved (44.3%), or is a water-based route across a lake or along a river (3.2%)
31 . Distance is not significantly correlated with trade costs for paved links but is correlated with a $0.183/t-km increase in trade costs for partially or fully unpaved links and a $0.314/t-km increase in trade costs for water-based links. In columns (3) and (4) I repeat these regressions including an indicator variable for whether at least one of the towns in a link has a population over 500,000 but find that this is not significantly correlated with trade costs. In table 10, I focus just on the 142 overland links that cross international borders within Africa. Distance and a difference in colonial language are not significantly correlated with higher trade costs for international links. The absence of a regional trade agreement between the countries is correlated with significantly higher trade costs 32 . A higher score on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index is correlated with lower trade costs as is a higher score on the border and customs clearance efficiency component of the World Bank Logistics Performance Index 33 , although these correlations lose significance when all variables are included in column (5). My trade cost estimation also includes trade costs between 30 African ports and the world market (Bangkok for rice and the US Gulf for other crops), which I estimate in the same way as overland trade costs as part of the iterative process outlined above. The median port-to-worldmarket trade cost I estimate is $0.275/kg or $275/tonne with over 70% of links having costs between $100 and $500/tonne. This compares to an average monthly transport cost of $50/tonne from the 31 Data on paved roads is obtained from 2002 Michelin Maps, a widely-cited authority for accurate information on road quality in Africa (see for instance Burgess et al 2015) . Water-based routes include 10 riverine links in the Congo River basin and 3 links crossing Lake Tanganyika.
32 Regional trade agreements included in this analysis are SADC, EAC, CEMAC, and ECOWAS. 33 CPI: 2013 rankings, score 0-100, higher score for less perception of corruption. LPI: 2014 rankings, score 1-5, higher score for better performance. For both indices, the scores of each country in a given link are added together to obtain the regressor. Note: Standard errors in (); * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Note: Robust standard errors in () clustered by country pair; * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
US Gulf to Durban, South Africa over the study period, as reported by the International Grains Council. Durban is the largest port in sub-Saharan Africa, handling four times more cargo than the largest of the 30 ports I consider with one-quarter of the dwell time, and it is strategically located on major global shipping lanes (African Development Bank 2010, Kgare et al 2011) . The higher range of costs I estimate for the ports I consider likely reflects lesser-used routes, increased port congestion with longer wait times, higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers, etc. In the online appendix, I show that higher sea trade costs are correlated with smaller port populations, lower port volumes, lower Corruption Perception Indices, and higher tariffs on grains, although none of the correlations are statistically significant, which is likely due to the small sample size and the idiosyncratic nature of port costs. For my main counterfactual, I lower sea trade costs to $50/tonne to match the freight rate to Durban.
Goodness of Fit
Having estimated both the demand parameters and the cost parameters, I proceed to use the estimated parameters to solve the model for equilibrium storage, trade, consumption, and prices of every grain in every market in every month. Before proceeding to my counterfactual analysis in the next section, it is important to verify the goodness of fit of the baseline estimated model. Of the four equilibrium variables, the only one I observe at the monthly, market level is prices, so I focus on comparing the model-generated equilibrium prices to the price data. Figure 5 shows the actual maize price series from the 4 markets in Kenya and Tanzania from figure 1 together with the model-generated price series for these markets. In general, the correlation of the levels of the actual and model-generated price series is high. The correlation coefficient for the average prices for a given market and crop is 0.787. Within markets for all pairs of two crops, the model correctly predicts which crop has a higher average price 83.3% of the time. The correlation of the model-generated prices and the price data within a particular price series seems lower, although the goodness of fit is more difficult to measure. The median correlation coefficient within price series is 0.385. As is clear from the sample price series in figure 5 , there are many month-to-month price fluctuations (due to new information, government interventions, etc.) that cannot be explained by the parsimonious data used by the representative traders in my model. It is also the case that the correlation coefficient does not fully reflect the goodness of fit of the price series. The maize price series from figure 5, for instance, have within series correlation coefficients of 0.136 (Mandera), 0.217 (Nairobi), 0.171 (Arusha), and 0.174 (Songea) for this period despite the fact that the overall shapes of the series (including the timing of peaks and troughs) appear quite similar between the data and the model.
In addition to monthly, market-level prices, I also observe annual, country-level trade flows as reported in national trade statistics and compiled by CEPII's BACI project (Gaulier and Zignago 2010) , which includes 37 of my 42 countries of interest as well as the rest of the world, which I group together into a 38th country 34 . Although these data are much less detailed than my model-generated trade data (1,510 vs. 55,440 observations), I can aggregate up my monthly, market-level equilibrium trade quantities and compare them to the annual, country-level data. In table 11, I compare net trade flows (exports minus imports) in the model and the data at different levels of aggregation. The first four rows compare net trade flows at the country level without distinguishing between specific origins and destinations, while in the bottom four rows I attempt to make this distinction by assigning observed trade with non-contiguous partner countries to the adjacent country through which such trade would have to pass so as to enable comparison with my model-generated trade flows. Correlation coefficients between net trade flows in the model and the data are generally very high, although they are somewhat lower at the lowest levels of aggregation. Despite high correlation coefficients, the model appears to perform only moderately well at predicting whether net trade flows are positive, negative, or zero in the data. However, this is largely due to sign discrepancies for very small or zero net trade flows. Once trade flows below a minimum threshold (T min = 10,000 t/year) are dropped, the model predicts the correct sign for net trade flows for well above 80% of observations at all levels of aggregation. Discrepancies between the model and the data -particularly for small trade volumes -are likely due in part to the existence of significant informal grain trade flows across borders in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, which are not captured by official trade statistics. Tschirley and Jayne 2010, for instance, cite estimates of informal, unrecorded cross-border trade flows of maize between Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe exceeding 100,000 t/year.
Having estimated the model and established that it can reproduce both the price data and annual, country-level trade data reasonably well, in the next section I conduct my counterfactual analysis in which I compare equilibrium outcomes under the baseline model to outcomes under counterfactuals in which I change some of the demand parameters, cost parameters, or exogenous variables.
Counterfactual Results
In this section, I present my counterfactual analysis and robustness checks. In my main counterfactual, I lower trade costs within sub-Saharan Africa and between sub-Saharan Africa and the world market to match benchmark freight rates elsewhere in the world. In two extensions, I explore the extent to which the gains from lower trade costs can be realized by focusing on a few key trade corridors and how the impact of agricultural technology adoption depends on trade costs.
Main Counterfactual: Lowering Trade Costs
What would be the gains from lowering trade costs in sub-Saharan Africa to match levels elsewhere in the world? To answer this question, I re-solve the model replacing just the trade cost parameters with values equivalent to $0.05/t-km for overland market links and $50/tonne for port-to-worldmarket links, in line with baseline freight rates from the rest of the world discussed previously 35 .
Importantly, this counterfactual does not reduce trade costs to zero (which would be impossible to achieve) but reduces them to match existing transport costs elsewhere in the world, a level which is potentially achievable. Empirically -as shown in the online appendix -price differences for grains between locations within the US and between the US Gulf and other major world markets rarely exceed these benchmark values, suggesting that transport costs make up most if not all of trade costs for grains in advanced countries and on the world market. This is consistent with the generally low or non-existent tariffs on grains in advanced countries and the low or non-existent information and search costs in these markets, where grains meeting standard quality specifications are traded on organized commodity exchanges.
For my counterfactual analysis, I continue to use the values of the exogenous variables (population, harvest, and world prices) from my period of interest (May 2003 -April 2013 . I re-solve the model month-by-month as before with only the trade cost parameters changed and compare the resulting equilibrium to my original one. Thus while my results show the effects of lowering trade costs for this particular period, the impact of lower trade costs could be larger or smaller during other periods where the exogenous variables are substantially different. Figure 6 compares the model-generated price series under actual high trade costs from figure 5 to the model-generated price series under counterfactual low trade costs for the 4 markets from figure 1. The direction of these aggregate results is explained by the fact that Africa as a whole is a net importer of grain, with most consumers and producers facing artificially high prices that fall once trade costs are lowered. Imports of grain from the world market increase by 32.0 million tonnes (17.5%), although the value of grain imports declines due to lower trade costs. Expenditure on trade costs declines substantially as does expenditure on storage costs (due to lower interest payments for storing cheaper grain and some substitution of trade for storage). Consumption of the outside good increases as less income is spent on grains. Overall welfare gains 36 Johannesburg, South Africa is excluded as I have treated it like the world market in my model.
are equivalent to 2.2% of GDP over the 10-year period (a $125.0 billion equivalent variation), with the benefits of lower consumer prices outweighing the income losses in the agricultural sector. Net Grain Imports -Quantity +32.0 million tonnes*** +17.5%*** (4.6 million tonnes) (1.8%)
Net Grain Imports -Value -$16.2 billion*** -20.9%*** ($1.2 billion) (0.9%)
Gross Trade Volumes +537.7 million tonnes*** +65.9%*** (48.4 million tonnes) (6.4%)
Expenditure on Trade Costs -$65.5 billion*** -72.8%*** ($3.0 billion) (1.0%)
Expenditure on Storage Costs -$27.3 billion*** -41.0%*** ($1.6 billion) (2.0%)
Consumption of Outside Good +$109.0 billion*** +2.1%*** ($4.7 billion) (0.1%) Welfare +$125.0 billion EV*** +2.2%*** ($5.6 billion EV) (0.1%) Note: Standard errors in () are bootstrapped (40 iterations) as described in the text; * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Standard errors in table 12 were obtained using a computationally-intensive bootstrapping procedure with 40 iterations. For each iteration, I re-solved the model for equilibrium storage, trade, consumption, and prices under both high and low trade costs using different demand and cost parameter estimates obtained by re-sampling the data used to estimate each parameter with replacement. Due to the lengthy run-time, I limit my iterations to 40 and do not report standard errors for the later counterfactuals in this paper.
In addition to the direct effect on price levels, lowering trade costs also affects local price volatility. In absolute terms, the average standard deviation of prices for the 511 grain price series falls from 0.188 to 0.123 (-34.5%) under low trade costs. However, in relative terms, the average coefficient of variation increases from 0.330 to 0.387 (+17.4%) due to the fall in the mean prices. A similar distinction holds for the frequency of high price events. In absolute terms, the frequency of grain prices over 1 USD/kg falls dramatically from 12.5% to 0.9% when trade costs are lowered. In relative terms, the frequency of grain prices exceeding double the series mean increases slightly from 2.0% to 2.1%. Lowering trade costs does therefore appear to be effective at preventing local prices from far exceeding regional and international levels as they have during events like the Horn of Africa famine (figure 1), but relative price volatility remains significant as high storage costs and similar agricultural calendars within regions mean that seasonal price fluctuations continue to be substantial (as seen in figure 6 ).
The aggregate results in table 12 do not reflect the heterogeneity of the effects of reducing trade costs across African markets and countries. Table 13 summarizes this heterogeneity by grouping markets and countries according to the sign of the changes they experience in their average grain price index, their net agricultural revenues, and their overall welfare when trade costs are lowered. The 181 markets (79.0%) and 37 countries in Group A are primarily net grain importers and experience changes similar to the continent-wide aggregate with falling prices and revenues and increasing welfare. The 14 markets (6.1%) and 2 countries (Malawi and Zambia) in Group B are primarily net grain exporters who experience price increases, revenue increases, and welfare increases under lower trade costs. This is not the case for all exporting regions: the 24 markets (10.5%) in Group C are net exporters that experience price decreases, revenue decreases, and welfare losses. These are mostly landlocked surplus regions (e.g. in the Sahel) that experience negative terms-of-trade effects when the urban and coastal regions they trade with are able to access cheaper grain imports from the world market. Finally, a small group of 10 markets (4.4%) and 2 countries (Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe) in Group D experience price decreases, revenue gains, and welfare gains due to their particular crop mix and/or their changing export position over time. The results discussed thus far reflect the effects of reducing trade costs in the short run when factors of production cannot reallocate between sectors. In the longer run, the large price changes that my model predicts under lower trade costs are likely to lead to the reallocation of factors of production. In the majority of markets (Group A), the decrease in the relative price of grains would lead to a shift of factors of production out of agriculture and into the outside good sector. Using my production model developed previously, I use the actual harvests and the baseline equilibrium prices to back out the implied productivity shocks B imt and then re-solve the counterfactual with an endogenous supply response using different values for the price elasticity of supply η. Roberts and Schlenker (2013) estimate the year-to-year price elasticity of supply for staple grains at 0.097. In the longer run, η may be larger (closer to η = 0.5), while a value of η = 1 would be considered unusually high in the agriculture literature. Table 14 compares results for key aggregate variables with an endogenous supply response for η = 0.1, η = 0.5, and η = 1 to results from the original counterfactual with no supply response (η = 0). As η increases, aggregate agricultural production in Africa falls, leading to a slightly smaller fall in prices, expenditure on grains, and net agricultural revenues (for which the price effect is larger than the quantity effect). Welfare, buoyed by increased income through increased production of the outside good, increases by more than before. Net grain imports from the rest of the world increase substantially as η increases, helping make up for the lower level of agricultural production within Africa 37 . The magnitude and direction of the changes in the aggregate variables remain similar to the base case, even when allowing for a large supply response (η = 1).
Robustness Checks and Alternate Approaches
My model and estimation strategy included several important assumptions. In this section, I explore the effects of relaxing some of these assumptions. When defining market catchment areas, I allocated all agricultural production in my 42 countries of interest to the 230 markets in my network. As an alternative, I define market catchment areas for all 263 markets on my initial ideal list and then drop production in the catchment areas of the 33 markets for which I was unable to obtain price data. Re-solving the model for both baseline and counterfactual scenarios using these revised production data does not change my results substantially. Results for all indicators in table 12 are well within 95% confidence intervals constructed using the standard errors reported there.
For my baseline estimation, I used the Cobb-Douglas elasticity of substitution (σ = 1) and set the price elasticity of demand for grains to match the estimate of Roberts and Schlenker 2013 ( = −0.066). Both of these values are at the lower end of elasticity estimates in the literature. In table 15, I compare my baseline results to results obtained using larger elasticities (σ = 3 and = −0.5) in my estimation. Each time I change an elasticity, I re-estimate the other demand parameters (α im and A m ) using the new elasticities, re-solve the model under both existing high trade costs and counterfactual low trade costs, and report the aggregate effects of lowering trade costs in table 15. Increasing the elasticity of substitution σ to 3 has virtually no impact on my aggregate results
38 . Increasing the price elasticity of demand to −0.5 leads to less of a fall in
37 This trend appears to reverse in the rightmost column (η = 1), but this is due to unrealistically large increases in production in 9 markets for which extremely low baseline equilibrium prices in some harvest periods imply unrealistically large productivity shocks when η = 1. Net grain exports from these 9 markets increase by over 100 million tonnes when moving from η = 0.5 to η = 1. The increased production in these 9 markets is also behind the much smaller loss in net agricultural revenues in this column.
38 This might seem surprising as the elasticity of substitution is in many trade models one of the key parameters expenditure on grains and net agricultural revenues, as consumers increase expenditure more under lower prices. However, the average fall in the grain price index is nearly the same as before, with net grain imports from the world market increasing by nearly eight times as much to cover increased demand. The overall welfare increase from decreasing trade costs does not change significantly from my baseline case. I next analyse the effects of my assumption about trader expectations, which is necessary for model tractability but is likely to lead to underestimates of equilibrium storage by eliminating the effects of uncertainty. To evaluate the extent to which this assumption affects my results, I build 30 individual, small-scale, tractable models of grain storage and trade with full rational expectations in which harvests and world prices are stochastic. For the purposes of these models, I collapse all months, all grains, and all markets in each country into a single annual national harvest for which I calculate a sample mean and variance over my 10 year period of interest. For 20 countries with ports or direct access to Johannesburg, South Africa, I build a model for each country with just that country and the world market. For the remaining 21 countries, I build 10 models each consisting of a landlocked country, a coastal country, and the world market 39 . I choose a centrally-located major city in each country and use my trade cost estimates to compute a single representative trade cost between each landlocked and coastal country and between each coastal country and the world market. I use my estimated demand parameters for each country as well as my estimated monthly storage cost parameters aggregated up to the annual level. For world prices, I compute a single annual world price index for each coastal country based on its harvest year and demand share parameters and calculate the sample variance of the month-tomonth change in price of these indices over my 10 year period of interest. Putting all of this information together, I use the RECS solver in MATLAB to solve each of the 30 models and run simulations using actual observed harvest and world price shocks to solve for equilibrium storage, trade, price, and consumption in every country in every year under full rational expectations. I then re-solve each model under counterfactual low trade costs.
determining the gains from trade (Arkolakis et al 2012) , with the gains from lower trade costs expected to be smaller with a higher elasticity of substitution. Here the gains are only slightly smaller when σ is 3 because each grain is a homogeneous good without location-specific varieties and most markets are either exporters or importers of all grains, so substitution between grains is second-order. 39 One of these models includes Rwanda and Burundi combined into a single landlocked country.
Despite volatile local harvests and high baseline trade costs, my results from this exercise indicate that inter-annual storage in Africa is limited even under full rational expectations, likely due to high storage costs and the position of most countries as net grain importers. Under existing high trade costs, an average of 2.0% of the grain harvest is stored inter-annually, and there is positive inter-annual storage in only 50 (12.5%) of the 400 total country-years in my 30 models. Under counterfactual low trade costs, an average of 0.3% of the grain harvest is stored interannually, and there is positive inter-annual storage in only 7 (1.8%) of the 400 total country-years in my 30 models, as cheaper trade serves as a partial substitute for storage.
The use of my assumption about trader expectations does appear to lead to underestimates of annual storage, but adjusting for these underestimates does not affect my main results. In my main model, under existing high trade costs, an average of 0.3% of the grain harvest is stored inter-annually, and there is positive inter-annual storage in just 1.5% of total market-crop-years, while under counterfactual low trade costs there is no inter-annual storage in any market-cropyear. To determine how allowing for full rational expectations affects my results, I re-solve my main model under both existing and counterfactual trade costs while restricting traders' choice of inter-annual storage of each grain in each market to equal the percentage of grain stored interannually in equilibrium for that country for that year in the results from my individual full rational expectations models. The percentage changes in net agricultural revenues, the average grain price index, expenditure on grains, and welfare are all within two tenths of a percentage point of my baseline results, and the results for all indicators in table 12 are well within 95% confidence intervals constructed using the standard errors reported there. Thus I conclude that my assumption about trader expectations does not have a statistically significant effect on my results.
Given the fact that inter-annual storage is limited, it is reasonable to ask to what extent my results would change if I used a more parsimonious model with no storage at all. In recent trade papers dealing with the agricultural sector (e.g. Costinot et al 2014) , it is common to use annual data on production and farm-gate prices, the prices farmers receive when they sell their produce immediately after harvest. Using annual data, one can avoid having to deal with harvest cycles and intra-annual storage, which is necessary for there to be positive consumption in non-harvest months. To better understand the differences between this approach and the one I have used in this paper, I use the harvest month price for each crop in each market from my baseline estimated model as the annual farm-gate price and build a new static model with all variables aggregated up to the annual level and no storage. I re-estimate trade costs for this new static annual model using the same approach as for my dynamic monthly model and then solve for equilibrium with both my new trade cost estimates and counterfactual low trade costs.
Trade cost estimates converge in 6 iterations for the static annual model, and each iteration takes only 2 minutes (less than 0.1% of the run-time for the dynamic monthly model). However, my trade cost estimates are 23.4% lower on average using the static annual model, and the overall welfare gain from lowering trade costs is 32.9% smaller than under the dynamic monthly model with storage. These differences can be explained by the pattern of equilibrium storage and trade described in Proposition 1. When production is widespread, trade between markets almost never occurs at the beginning of the harvest cycle when farm-gate prices are measured. During this period, local production and storage is used for consumption, spatial arbitrage conditions do not bind, and equilibrium price gaps are narrower. Instead, trade occurs primarily at the end of the harvest cycle once local stocks have been depleted, which is when equilibrium price gaps are wider and spatial arbitrage conditions bind. Using monthly data and a dynamic model with storage to identify more precisely when agricultural trade occurs thus seems important to avoid underestimating trade costs and their effects on welfare, particularly in developing country contexts with large seasonal price fluctuations. Further details on this exercise with graphical examples are contained in the online appendix.
Having confirmed the robustness of my main results to the relaxation of several of my key assumptions and explored alternate approaches, I next turn my attention to two extensions in which I run additional counterfactuals to further explore the consequences of high trade costs in sub-Saharan Africa and the options for reducing them.
Extension: Trade Corridors
Reducing trade costs everywhere in Africa to match transport costs elsewhere in the world is likely not feasible in the short run. However, it may be feasible to reduce trade costs along certain high-priority routes. This section considers the extent to which some routes matter more than others for achieving the welfare effects of the main counterfactual. Even if a long-term goal of reducing trade costs everywhere is maintained, trade cost reduction will not be simultaneous, so the results in this section also shed light on welfare effects during the potentially long transitional period from a high trade cost to a low trade cost regime.
I start by looking at the effects of reducing trade costs along the 413 overland links within Africa while holding port-to-world-market sea trade costs constant and of reducing port-to-worldmarket sea trade costs while holding overland trade costs constant. Results in the second and third columns of table 16 indicate that while overland trade cost reduction accounts for over 70% of the overall welfare gain, nearly half of the overall welfare gain is achievable by just reducing sea trade costs between African ports and the world market. Overland trade and sea trade are partial substitutes as both can reduce prices in grain-deficit markets.
Since reducing port-to-world-market sea trade costs is likely more feasible than reducing overland trade costs everywhere in Africa, I start with this scenario and then look at whether adding trade cost reductions on a few key overland routes can substantially narrow the gap with my main counterfactual. I select key routes by first identifying the markets with the biggest welfare gaps between the "just sea" scenario in column 3 and the main counterfactual in column 1 and then identifying the most important overland links connecting these markets to their trading partners. In columns 4 and 5 of table 16, I show that adding trade cost reductions on just 30 overland links (7.3%) to the "just sea" scenario allows for over 70% of welfare gains to be achieved, and adding trade cost reductions on 75 overland links (18.2%) allows for 86% of welfare gains to be achieved. These results are encouraging for policy-makers and multilateral donors who may have limited resources to invest in trade cost reduction. Generally speaking, the results suggest that investment in "trade corridors" of the type promoted by the African Development Bank and other institutional donors may be worthwhile. Although it is likely that the specific corridors I identify might not be the most important ones when other goods besides grains are considered, my corridor selection exercise, which is detailed in the online appendix, suggests that certain types of corridors may be particularly beneficial. First, reducing trade costs from the world market all the way to "dry ports" in densely-populated inland areas like Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Kinshasa, D.R. Congo can achieve major welfare gains even if trade costs from the dry ports to further-inland areas remain high. Second, reducing trade costs along inland corridors with imbalances or fluctuations in production and consumption (e.g. the trans-Sahelian highway) can lead to large gains without significant involvement of the world market. Third, targeting those inland areas isolated by extremely high trade costs (e.g. South Sudan) can lead to very large welfare improvements for those areas.
Extension: Technology Adoption and Trade Costs
In 2013, African cereal grain yields averaged 1.4 tonnes per hectare, compared to 3.1 in South Asia, 4.2 in Latin America, and 7.3 in the US. Low productivity in African agriculture is primarily due to the low use of inputs like fertilizer, and institutional donors and organizations like the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) are promoting technology adoption to narrow this productivity gap. This section uses my estimated model to look at the effects that widespread technology adoption in Africa would have under existing high trade costs and counterfactual low trade costs.
A complete model of technology adoption is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I estimate what would happen if productivity everywhere in Africa doubled, i.e. if African cereal grain yields increased to 2.8 tonnes per hectare, which is much closer though still below levels elsewhere in the world. In the context of my model of production, this is equivalent to a doubling of all B imt , which would double agricultural production in the short run (η = 0). Practically speaking, I implement this counterfactual by doubling the harvest (H imt ) in all markets and all time periods while keeping all other exogenous variables and parameters the same 40 . Table 17 compares results for key aggregate indicators from my main counterfactual (first column), counterfactuals with technology adoption under high trade costs (second column) and low trade costs (third column), and a combined counterfactual in which trade costs are lowered and technology adoption occurs (fourth column = first column + third column) 41 . Under high trade costs, technology adoption leads to a collapse of prices and agricultural revenues, as high trade costs confine much of the increased production to local markets with inelastic demand. Only 39 markets (17.0%) experience an increase in agricultural revenues, 37 of which are net importers for which increased production primarily serves to replace imports so that the price does not fall as much as in other markets 42 . In contrast, under low trade costs, agricultural revenues increase on aggregate and for 184 individual markets (80.3%), as much more of the increased production can be exported to deficit areas and the world market. Low trade costs are thus a prerequisite for widespread technology adoption to increase the incomes of African farmers. The net welfare effect of doubling productivity through technology adoption is similar in magnitude to the net welfare effect of lowering trade costs 43 . Although lower trade costs and productivity improvements are partial substitutes as both lead to lower prices in most markets, the combined welfare effect of both (4.4%) represents 92% of the sum of the effects of each intervention on its own (2.2% + 2.6% = 4.8%). These findings suggest that agricultural policy in Africa should give as much weight to trade cost reduction as to technology adoption and prioritize comprehensive approaches that include both. 40 In the online appendix, I experiment with increasing production by less than 100% (10%, 20%,... 90%) and find that the effects always have the same sign, with lower percentages just leading to lower magnitudes.
41 For ease of comparison, all percentage changes in table 17 are given in terms of the baseline equilibrium with existing high trade costs and low productivity.
42 The other 2 markets are net exporters that have relatively cheap access to the world market even under high trade costs and/or have changing export positions over time.
43 If policies that reduce agricultural trade costs also reduces trade costs for other sectors, the effect of lowering trade costs would likely be much larger than the effect of doubling productivity just in the agricultural sector.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have built, estimated, and solved a dynamic model of agricultural storage and trade in sub-Saharan Africa and used it to estimate the gains from reducing trade costs to levels on par with the rest of the world. I began by assembling a new intra-national dataset of monthly prices and production of the 6 major staple cereal grains in 230 market catchment areas covering all 42 countries of continental sub-Saharan Africa over the ten-year period from May 2003 to April 2013. I then wrote down a dynamic model of storage and trade under uncertainty in which a representative consumer in each market chooses consumption of each grain and an outside good given prices and income in each period and a representative competitive trader in each market chooses how much of available grain to put into storage, sell locally, and import or export from other markets given current and expected stocks, harvests, world prices, and consumption demand across all markets in the network. I used my data to estimate both the model's demand parameters and its cost parameters (including trade costs for each of 413 overland links and between each of 30 ports and the world market). My storage and trade cost estimation strategy utilized a novel iterative approach to determine the markets and periods in which the storage and trade arbitrage conditions were binding. The median intra-national trade cost I estimated using this approach is over 5 times higher than benchmark freight rates elsewhere in the world.
After solving my estimated model for equilibrium storage, trade, consumption, and prices for every grain in every market in every month, I proceeded to re-solve the model for several counterfactual scenarios. In my main counterfactual, I lowered agricultural trade costs within Africa and between Africa and the world market to match transport costs elsewhere in the world. On aggregate, lower trade costs would have led to a large drop in grain prices, agricultural revenues, and expenditure on grains in sub-Saharan Africa during the study period, with an overall welfare gain equivalent to 2.2% of GDP. These findings change only slightly when allowing for reallocation of factors of production in the long run and are robust to alternative demand specifications and the relaxation of the key assumption about trader expectations that I used for tractability. There is significant variation in these effects between markets within Africa, with some markets experiencing increases in prices, revenue, and welfare, and others experiencing welfare losses due to terms-oftrade effects. Using a dynamic monthly model with storage is important for correctly identifying when agricultural trade occurs, particularly in contexts like this one with large seasonal price fluctuations. In my case, I showed that a static annual model underestimates trade costs by 23% and welfare effects by 33%.
In two extensions, I explored the extent to which investment in select trade corridors could achieve similar gains to continent-wide trade cost reduction and the degree to which the impact of productivity-enhancing technology adoption depends on trade costs. I showed that reducing port-to-world-market trade costs and trade costs along just 18% of the 413 overland links enables achievement of 86% of overall welfare gains, suggesting that a corridor-based approach to trade cost reduction may be efficient in this context. The effects of technology adoption are very different under existing high and counterfactual low trade costs. Doubling agricultural productivity leads to large declines in net agricultural revenues under existing high trade costs due to limited market access and inelastic local demand. In contrast, the same productivity change under counterfactual low trade costs leads to increases in net agricultural revenues as surplus production can be exported. The welfare gains from trade cost reduction and technology adoption are similar in magnitude and nearly additive when both occur together, highlighting the importance of prioritizing both in agricultural policy.
The findings in this paper complement and need to be further complemented by micro-level studies looking at the components of trade costs, the impact of policies designed to reduce trade costs, and the size and nature of farm-to-hub-market trade costs. It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify precise components of trade costs, but my trade cost estimates can be a useful starting point for studies that attempt to do so. Since intra-national price data on staple grains is relatively widely available for sub-Saharan African markets, these data could be used as the basis for evaluating the impact of specific policy interventions on trade costs and welfare using some of the techniques used in this paper. Importantly, this paper considered only trade costs between the 230 large hub markets in my dataset. Farm-to-hub-market trade costs are potentially even larger and their reduction would likely have a positive effect on farmer incomes, although the significant market power of traders in remote rural areas must be taken into account.
Aside from the findings of my counterfactuals, a major contribution of this paper is the estimated model of African agricultural storage and trade in and of itself. The model can potentially be used to explore many additional counterfactuals beyond the few considered in this particular paper, including the effects of events like climate change, international food price spikes, conflicts, and disease outbreaks on prices, revenues, and welfare in individual markets or countries or for the continent as a whole.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions Proposition 1. Consider any two markets m and n. If m and n have identical storage costs then neither market stores and imports from the other simultaneously in equilibrium, i.e. for any month t and grain i:
S int > 0 ⇒ T imnt ≤ 0 and T imnt > 0 ⇒ S int = 0 with a symmetric condition holding for S imt and trade from n to m. Corollary 1. Consider a particular harvest year for two markets m and n with net trade of grain i from m to n in equilibrium. Let the harvest year months be indexed s with the last month before the next harvests. Let the first month with trade from m to n be designated s * . Then the following must be true for any grain i: (i) If r m ≤ r n and k m − k n < rmτmn 1+rm
, then S ins > 0 for s < s * − 1, S ins ≥ 0 for s = s * − 1, S ins = 0 for s ≥ s * , T imns ≤ 0 for s < s * , and T imns > 0 for s ≥ s * . Traders store first and trade later. (ii) If r m ≥ r n and k m − k n > rmτmn 1+rm
, then S ins > 0 for s < s * − 1, S ins ≥ 0 for s = s * − 1, S ins > 0 for s * ≤ s <s, T imns * > 0, and T imns ≤ 0 for all s = s * . Trade from m to n only occurs in month s * . (iii) For any values of r m , r n , k m , and k n , the pattern of storage and trade will be the same as (i) if the following expression is negative and the same as (ii) if the following expression is positive:
(1 + r m )k m − (1 + r n )k n + (r m − r n )P ims * − r n τ mn Corollary 2. Given a set of demand and cost parameters, there is a unique grain market equilibrium (competitive equilibrium).
Proof. Let m and n have identical storage costs k and r. First note that the spatial arbitrage condition must hold in expectation in period t + 1:
Suppose market n has both imports and storage of grain i in period t (S int > 0 and T imnt > 0). Then by equations 11 and 12:
T imnt > 0 ⇒ P int = P imt + τ mn (27) Combining these two equations gives:
The temporal arbitrage condition for market m implies:
Combining these two equations gives:
Which is a contradiction of equation 25, thus proving the main proposition. For the first corollary, I allow for the possibility that r m = r n and k m = k n and use subscripts s for the months of the particular harvest year. 
Now suppose that k m − k n < rmτmn 1+rm
. Then:
This is a contradiction of equation 25, so the conditions of the main proposition hold. By definition, any months before s * have T imns ≤ 0, with or without storage (S ins ≥ 0). In order to ensure positive grain consumption in these months, S ins > 0 for s < s * − 1. By the main proposition, T imns * > 0 ⇒ S ins * = 0. Now consider the month s * + 1. Since there is no additional harvest and S ins * = 0, the only source of grain for consumption is imports, so T imn,s * +1 > 0 and S ins * +1 = 0. The same holds true for all s ≥ s * . Now consider case (ii). Consider the first month with trade from m to n, s * . Suppose that there is also expected trade from m to n in the following month, i.e. E[T imn,s * +1 ] > 0. Then S m > 0 as there is no subsequent harvest. Thus the following three arbitrage conditions are binding: Substituting the first and second of these conditions into the third I get: Now suppose that r m ≥ r n and k m − k n > rmτmn 1+rm
(so that k m − rmτmn 1+rm > k n ). Then I get: This is a contradiction of the temporal arbitrage condition for market n. The intuition is that with sufficiently higher storage costs in m it is cheaper to import first and store the imports in n for later consumption. Since having imports in s * and in s * + 1 led to a contradiction and since s * was the first month with imports, it follows that T imns * > 0 and T imns ≤ 0 for all s = s * . With month, so the equilibria are identical, a contradiction. Now suppose there is trade between the markets in one equilibrium and there is no trade between the markets in the other equilibrium. If the markets were in autarky (no trade allowed) then there would be a unique equilibrium (as shown above). Now they open up to trade. If there is a no-trade equilibrium then the autarky price gaps are always less than or equal to trade costs. If there is a trade equilibrium then the autarky price gaps exceed trade costs in some periods. Since there is a unique autarky equilibrium, this is a contradiction. Now suppose there is trade between the markets in both equilibria. Without loss of generality let m by the exporting market and n the importing market. Given the exogenous harvest in each market, t H imt + t H int = t Q imt + t Q int = t Q imt + t Q int . The overall pattern of storage and trade is determined by the first corollary (case (i) or case (ii)). In either case, the price of a particular grain in every market in every period is connected to the price in any other marketperiod by a series of temporal or spatial arbitrage conditions that must hold with equality. If there were two sets of prices such that the relevant arbitrage conditions were satisfied with equality then t Q imt + t Q int = t Q imt + t Q int , a contradiction. Therefore P imt = P imt ⇒ Q imt = Q imt for every grain and month for both m and n, which in turn implies by the first corollary that T imnt = T imnt , S imt = S imt , and S int = S int , so the equilibria are identical, a contradiction. Now allow for multiple harvest years with storage possible between years. Initial entering stocks in the very first period are exogenous and hence identical for the two equilibria. Consider the first harvest year and the first inter-harvest storage decision. With identical available supply and identical expectations, traders will make the same inter-harvest storage decision in both equilibria, with the location of the inter-harvest storage determined by the proposition and first corollary. With identical entering stocks, harvests, and inter-harvest storage, t Q imt + t Q int = t Q imt + t Q int for the first harvest year, so the results above hold. For the second harvest year, identical inter-harvest storage from the first year and identical exogenous harvests imply identical total available supply again, so the same arguments hold. Thus the equilibria are identical, a contradiction. Now consider extending the two-market multi-year case to many markets (still with no world market). Assume that there are no knife-edge cases, i.e. cases where grain can pass from one market to another market elsewhere in the network by two routes with identical costs. By analogy to the two-market case, any two equilibria must have the same subset of markets linked by trade. For this subset of markets, inter-harvest storage decisions are identical across equilibria and m t Q imt = m t Q imt within harvest years. As in the two-market case, for each harvest year, the price of a particular grain in every market in every period is connected to the price in every other market-period by a series of temporal or spatial arbitrage conditions that must hold with equality and are determined by the first corollary. If there were two sets of prices such that the relevant arbitrage conditions were satisfied with equality then m t Q imt = m t Q imt , a contradiction. Therefore P imt = P imt ⇒ Q imt = Q imt for every grain-market-month, which in turn implies by the first corollary that T imnt = T imnt and S imt = S imt , so the equilibria are identical, a contradiction. Now consider extending the multi-market multi-year case to include the world market with perfectly elastic supply and monthly price uncertainty. Each month, traders (who have identical expectations) make supply allocation plans for current and future months based on price expectations. Consider two different plans for a particular month t. If neither or only one of these plans includes trade with the world market, there is a contradiction by the arguments above. Suppose both plans include trade with the world market. The trade pattern with the world market is determined as in the first corollary. For a given plan, planned prices in all markets connected by trade to the world market in all periods connected by storage to the period with trade with the world market are pinned down by the expected world market price. Since both plans have the same trade pattern, P imt = P imt ⇒ Q imt = Q imt for every grain, market, and month, which in turn implies by the first corollary that T imnt = T imnt and S imt = S imt , so the plans are identical, a contradiction. Since a given plan for a particular month t is unique, all equilibrium P imt , Q imt , S imt , and T imnt for that month will be unique. By extension, the grain market equilibrium for all months will be unique.
A unique grain market equilibrium implies a unique competitive equilibrium. This completes the proof.
